My dissertation seeks to fortify the case for reparation, especially by identifying reparation's importance within egalitarian political theory. Each chapter evaluates a specific dimension of reparationist politics.

Chapter 1: Who Pays Reparation?
Chapter 1 introduces, and strengthens, the perennial objection that reparation wrongfully imposes burdens on innocent taxpayers. I pay special attention to a popular response—the idea that reparation does not constitute wrongful imposition because present-day taxpayers benefit from historic injustice. In the literature, this argument has tended to rely on the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP). As I argue, BPP fails to vindicate reparation against the charge of wrongful imposition. In general, BPP constitutes weak support for reparation. In its place, I offer a new theory about the way benefits of injustice might improve the fairness of reparation.

Chapter 2: Redress and Leviathon
Chapter 2 introduces a new theory of reparation's egalitarian significance—the disciplinary theory of reparation. It is often claimed that reparation has a special relationship to equality. I argue that the best way to theorize this relationship is in terms of reparation's retributive dimensions. To see this, we need to update relational egalitarian theory. What is missing is an emphasis on the need for relational "leveling down." In cases of state-based racism, the state acts as a kind of master over racial victims. This type of perverse self-aggrandizement calls for demotion and discipline. Masters must be brought low. Reparation plays a unique and indispensable role in achieving this task. I explain how this theory compares to, and improves upon, other theories of reparation.

Chapter 3: Redress and Police Injustice—Why the Police Must Pay
Finally, police violence is an enduring reality in communities across the United States. Chapter 3 argues that police departments ought to be held responsible for bearing the cost of reparation for their violent abuses of power, especially abuses with a racist flavor. This requires going beyond typical models for compensating victims of police brutality—settlements with the city or police insurance schemes. The police must pay. I defend this view by drawing on the theory of reparation developed in chapter 2. Simultaneously, I explain why policing is institutionally unique, in comparison to other public institutions. This explains why police injustice is especially expressive of master-like status, calling for redress by means of reparation. I conclude by explaining how police reparation complements abolitionist politics.